LOS ANGELES (May 21, 2006) - According to recent estimates, hepatitis has become a worldwide health problem, affecting millions of people in the U.S. and abroad.

Researchers are experimenting with combinations of anti-inflammatory medicines like interferons to improve hepatitis symptoms. In research presented today at Digestive Disease Week® 2006 (DDW), new combinations of therapies are making significant progress to improve symptoms of the disease. DDW is the largest international gathering of physicians and researchers in the fields of gastroenterology, hepatology, endoscopy and gastrointestinal surgery.

Hepatitis is caused by a virus that attacks the liver, triggering painful inflammation and often leading to more serious conditions like liver failure and even death. Several different forms of hepatitis exist, including hepatitis A, B and C. Hepatitis A is generally food-borne, while hepatitis B and C are spread primarily through parenteral or sexual routes. The disease is often caused by a virus, but can also result from alcohol, toxins or drugs.

"Despite the significant number of people suffering from hepatitis, treatment options have been lagging in comparison to other major diseases," said John Vierling, M.D., FACP, president, the American Association for the Study of Liver Diseases (AASLD); professor of Medicine and Surgery at the Baylor College of Medicine in Houston, Texas; and director of Baylor Liver Health and Chief of Hepatology. "We hope that continued research like these studies will lead to more significant breakthroughs and relief for these patients."

Valopicitabine (NM283), Alone or with Peg-Interferon, Compared to Peg Interferon/Ribavirin (pegIFN/RBV) Retreatment in Hepatitis C Patients with Prior Non-Response to PegIFN/RBV: Week 24 Results [Abstract 4]

More than half of currently treated hepatitis patients are infected with strains of hepatitis C that do not respond to current interferon therapies and have no other effective treatment options. Combination treatment using a new antiviral therapy is showing promise in suppressing the virus, according to a phase II US multi-center study. The therapy, valopicitabine, has shown anti-HCV activity alone and in combination with pegIFN (pegylated interferon) in early trials, without viral breakthrough for study periods up to six months.

The current study compared the outcomes of five different treatments in patients who have not experienced remission with standard therapies: valopicitabine alone (800 mg/d), one of three combination arms with the drug at 400 mg/d, 800 mg/d or dose-ramping 400 to 800 mg/d plus pegIFN, or pegIFN with ribavirin as a control group.

For the 162 patients who have completed the trial period at 24 weeks, results show that the two higher-dose combination arms had much better response rates than the control group, experiencing on average a 2.5 to 3.0 log decrease in hepatitis RNA reductions by week 24, a significantly better response than the comparator. No viral breakthrough has been seen to date. However, vomiting and dehydration requiring hospitalization occurred in three patients taking the highest dose (800 mg), forcing the research team to halt the use of that dose and continue using only the lower doses of 200 to 400 mg of the drug.

"For patients whose disease has not responded to current therapies, this new combination treatment may produce excellent results, at the maximally acceptable dosage," according to Paul Pockros, M.D., of Scripps Clinic in California, and lead study author. "Continued treatment will determine if these encouraging early responses will result in a sustained response, hopefully improving patient quality of life and long-term survival."

Comparison of Daily Consensus Interferon versus Peginterferon alfa 2a Extended Therapy of 72 Weeks for Peginterferon / Ribavirin Relapse Patients with Chronic Hepatitis C [Abstract S1060]

In chronic diseases like hepatitis, symptoms have a tendency to fluctuate in severity. As a result, researchers are finding that the diseases may react more successfully to a longer duration of therapy. In this study, researchers at the University of Tuebingen in Germany compared two combination therapies for an extended treatment period of 72 weeks, compared to the current standard of 48 weeks, in patients with chronic hepatitis C.

Previous studies have shown that with 48 weeks of therapy, relapse rates are near 20 to 30 percent, but with an extended duration of 72 weeks, rates may be reduced. The research team compared the efficacy of daily doses of CIFN (consensus interferon) plus ribavirin (RBV) versus pegIFN (pegylated interferon alfa 2a) plus RBV for 72 weeks in patients with a prior relapse to 48 weeks of treatment. A total of 81 patients were treated with either CIFN or with pegIFN a2a for 72 weeks, both in combination with RBV.

After the initial 12 weeks, a primary response to therapy, noted as a reduction in hepatitis RNA, was observed in 83 percent of patients in the CIFN group and 78 percent of the pegIFN group. At the end of treatment at week 72, the vast majority (89 percent) of both the CIFN group and pegIFN group (76 percent) were in remission. After finishing treatment, two-thirds of the CIFN group (69 percent) experienced sustained response, but less than half of the pegIFN group (44 percent) experienced these results, indicating a significantly higher relapse rate in this group.

"While many patients did relapse after discontinuing treatment, the overall sustained response rates are nevertheless promising, showing a sustained response in up to 70 percent of patients," said Stephan Kaiser, M.D., of the University of Tuebingen, and lead study author. "We believe that extended treatment with CIFN combined with RBV may be a better option than current standards for this difficult-to-treat patient group."

The overall tolerability of the CIFN regimen was comparable to PEG IFN. Three patients experienced thrombocytopenias (reduced blood platelets), but there were no severe neutropenias (low white blood cell count) or thrombocytopenias. CIFN patients experienced a higher rate of injection site reactions and a slightly higher drop-out rate of 18 percent, compared to only 12 percent of the pegIFN group.

28 Days of the Hepatitis C Protease Inhibitor VX-950, In Combination with Peg-Interferon-Alfa-2a and Ribavirin, is Well-Tolerated and Demonstrates Robust Antiviral Effects [Abstract 686f]

Scientists are reviewing new compounds in combination with current standard hepatitis therapies to produce better patient outcomes. A new oral peptidomimetic protease inhibitor, VX-950, has previously shown substantial anti-viral effects in combination with the frequently used hepatitis therapy pegylated interferon (pegIFN). In this study, researchers evaluated the safety and antiviral response of VX-950 in combination with pegIFN and ribavirin (RBV).

The study included 12 hepatitis C patients who received 750 mg of VX-950 every eight hours, 180 ìg of pegIFN weekly, and either 1000 or 1200 mg of RBV daily. After 28 days, patients began standard therapy with pegIFN/RBV.

All patients responded to the study drug regimen and showed continual declines in hepatitis RNA throughout the treatment period. Two patients had levels of HCV RNA in their blood below the limits of detection of a highly sensitive assay after just eight days. All patients had undetectable HCV RNA by the end of 28 days. No patients experienced viral breakthrough at any time.

"These data confirm the rapid and dramatic antiviral effects of VX-950. All subjects achieving undetectable HCV RNA within 28 days of treatment is an unprecedented result with an investigational agent," said Eric Lawitz, M.D., of Alamo Medical Research, Texas, and lead author of the study. "We look forward to future studies which will evaluate the ability of VX-950 to produce sustained viral responses with as little as 12 weeks of therapy." VX-950 + pegIFN + RBV was well tolerated, with no serious adverse events and no treatment discontinuations. A detailed analysis of adverse events will be presented.

Acetaminophen as a co-factor in acute liver failure due to viral hepatitis determined by measurement of acetaminophen-protein adducts [Abstract S1002]

Acetaminophen (APAP) is a common over-the-counter medication present in more than 300 preparations for pain relief and flu-like symptoms. But for people who are suffering from viral hepatitis A or B, use of acetaminophen may play a role in accelerating liver failure, ordinarily a rare complication of viral hepatitis.

Serum samples from 72 patients with proven hepatitis A or B that had progressed to liver failure were tested for APAP adducts, which are the toxic byproducts of acetaminophen liver damage, created when a chemical (in this case, acetaminophen) binds to proteins in the liver that are then released into the blood when cells die. As a positive control group, the team also included 10 documented cases of acute liver failure (ALF) resulting directly from large APAP overdoses.

Results from the examination showed that nine of the 72 patients (12.5 percent) had detectable APAP adducts in their blood, signifying that some of their liver damage was APAP-related. All 10 known APAP-induced ALF cases had positive adducts at much higher levels than those in the viral hepatitis group (average level of 5.58 nmol/mL versus 0.45 nmol/mL, respectively). Two-thirds (67 percent) of the hepatitis patients with APAP adducts died within three weeks of study admission, compared to only 27 percent of hepatitis patients without adducts.

Most of the patients with adducts reported some APAP use in the days prior to the study, but none reported doses exceeding four grams per day. Flu-like symptoms, nausea and vomiting are common in patients with early viral hepatitis and APAP is commonly used in this setting.

"This study suggests that acetaminophen, even when taken at therapeutic dosages, is responsible for a second hit in viral hepatitis and explains why some patients develop acute liver failure and death in this setting," said William M. Lee, M.D., of the UT Southwestern Medical Center in Texas, and senior study author. "Warnings regarding use of acetaminophen should be clearly communicated to patients with acute viral hepatitis, particularly those of moderate severity, to reduce these bad outcomes from a relatively benign disease."

n March 2003 the WHO and U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention issued a global alert over cases of atypical pneumonia that do not appear to respond to treatment. This happened after outbreaks have occurred in several counties over the past month. Countries include Canada, China, Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of China, Indonesia, Singapore, Thailand, and Viet Nam.

SARS or Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome is a form of lung injury characterized by increased permeability of the alveolar-capillary membrane, diffuse alveolar damage, and the accumulation of proteinaceous pulmonary edema and rapidly leads to pulmonary failure.

Cause

Just last month it was not known if this disease is caused by a virus or a bacteria. Now it has been established that the SARS virus is a new coronavirus unlike any other known human or animal virus in the Coronavirus family. Because the virus is new, much about its behaviour is poorly understood.

Spread

Spread seems to be person-to-person, with a number of cases in Asia being reported among health care and other hospital workers, as well as household contacts of the patients.

That pattern of transmission is typical of any flu-like illness. The average incubation period between exposure to a sick person and onset of symptoms is about three days. The CDC put the incubation period at between two and seven days.

As of today (19th of April, 2003), a cumulative total of 3547 cases with 182 deaths have been reported from 25 countries. Compared with yesterday, 12 new deaths, all in Hong Kong SAR, have been reported.

The main symptoms of SARS as outlined by WHO

Suspect Case
A person presenting after 1 February 2003 with history of :
high fever (>38oC)
AND
one or more respiratory symptoms including cough, shortness of breath, difficulty breathing
AND one or more of the following:
close contact with a person who has been diagnosed with SARS
recent history of travel to areas reporting cases of SARS

Probable Case
A suspect case with chest x-ray findings of pneumonia or Respiratory Distress Syndrome
OR
A person with an unexplained respiratory illness resulting in death, with an autopsy examination demonstrating the pathology of Respiratory Distress Syndrome without an identifiable cause.


In addition to fever and respiratory symptoms, SARS may be associated with other symptoms including: headache, muscular stiffness, loss of appetite, malaise, confusion, rash, and diarrhea.
Early laboratory findings include low platelet and white blood cell counts. In some cases, those symptoms are followed by pneumonia in both lungs, sometimes requiring use of a respirator.


Lab Diagnosis

Researchers in several countries are working towards developing fast and accurate laboratory tests for the SARS. However, until those tests have been adequately field tested and shown to be reliable, SARS diagnosis remains dependant on the clinical findings of an atypical pneumonia not attributed to another cause and a history of exposure to a suspect or probable case of SARS or their respiratory secretions and other bodily fluids. This requirement is reflected in the current WHO case definitions for suspect or probable SARS .

Status of laboratory tests currently under development

1 Antibody tests
- ELISA (Enzyme Linked ImmunoSorbant Assay) detects antibodies in the serum of SARS patients reliably as from day 21 after the onset of clinical symptoms and signs.
- Immunofluorescence Assays detect antibodies in serum of SARS patients after about day 10 of illness onset. This is a reliable test requiring the use of fixed SARS-virus, an immunofluorescence microscope and an experienced microscopist. Positive antibody tests indicate that the patient was infected with the SARS -virus.

2 Molecular tests (PCR)
PCRcan detect genetic material of the SARS -virus in various specimens (blood, stool, respiratory secretions or body tissue). Primers, which are the key pieces for a PCR test, have been made publicly available by WHO network laboratories on the WHO web site . The primers have since been used by numerous countries around the world. A ready-to-use PCR test kit containing primers and positive and negative control has been developed. Testing of the kit by network members is expected to quickly yield the data needed to assess the test’s performance, in comparison with primers developed by other WHO network laboratories. Existing PCR tests are very specific but lack sensitivity. That means that negative tests can’t rule out the presence of the SARS virus in patients. Various WHO network laboratories are working on their PCR protocols and primers to improve their reliability.

3 Cell culture
Virus in specimens (such as respiratory secretions, blood or stool) from SARS patients can also be detected by infecting cell cultures and growing the virus. Once isolated, the virus must be identified as the SARS virus with further tests. Cell culture is a very demanding test, but the only means to show the existence of a live virus.

Treatment of SARS

Currently there are no specific therapies. However, the use of physiologically targeted strategies of mechanical ventilation and intensive care unit management including fluid management and glucorticoids is the only supportive therapy available. Until more is known about the cause of these outbreaks, WHO recommends that patients with SARS be isolated with barrier nursing techniques and treated as clinically indicated. At the same time, WHO recommends that any suspect cases be reported to national health authorities.

WHO Management Guidelines

These guidelines are constantly reviewed and updated as new information becomes available. They are compiled to provide a generic basis on which national health authorities may wish to develop guidelines applicable to their own particular circumstance.

Revised 11 April 2003

Management of Suspect and Probable SARS Cases

  • Hospitalize under isolation or cohort with other suspect or probable SARS cases (see Hospital Infection Control Guidance )
  • Take samples (sputum, blood, sera, urine,) to exclude standard causes of pneumonia (including atypical causes); consider possibility of coinfection with SARS and take appropriate chest radiographs.
  • Take samples to aid clinical diagnosis SARS including:
    White blood cell count, platelet count, creatine phosphokinase, liver function tests, urea and electrolytes, C reactive protein and paired sera. (Pair sera will be invaluable in the understanding of SARS even if the patient is later not considered a SARS case)
  • At the time of admission the use of antibiotics for the treatment of community-acquired pneumonia with atypical cover is recommended
  • Pay particular attention to therapies/interventions which may cause aerolization such as the use of nebulisers with a bronchodilator, chest physiotherapy, bronchoscopy, gastroscopy, any procedure/intervention which may disrupt the respiratory tract. Take the appropriate precautions (isolation facility, gloves, goggles, mask, gown, etc. ) if you feel that patients require the intervention/therapy.
  • In SARS, numerous antibiotic therapies have been tried with no clear effect. Ribavirin with or without use of steroids has been used in an increasing number of patients. But, in the absence of clinical indicators, its effectiveness has not been proven. It has been proposed that a coordinated multicentred approach to establishing the effectiveness of ribavirin therapy and other proposed interventions be examined.

Definition of a SARS Contact

A contact is a person who may be at greater risk of developing SARS because of exposure to a suspect or probable case of SARS. Information to date suggests that risky exposures include having cared for, lived with, or having had direct contact with the respiratory secretions, body fluids and/or excretion (e.g. faeces) of a suspect or probable cases of SARS.

Management of Contacts of Probable SARS Cases

  • Give information on clinical picture, transmission, etc. of SARS to the contact
  • Place under active surveillance for 10 days and recommend voluntary home isolation
  • Ensure contact is visited or telephoned daily by a member of the public health care team
  • Record temperature daily
  • If the contact develops disease symptoms, the contact should be investigated locally at an appropriate health care facility
  • The most consistent first symptom that is likely to appear is fever

Management of Contacts of Suspect SARS Cases

As a minimum the following follow up is recommended:

  • Give information on clinical picture, transmission etc of SARS to the contact
  • Place under passive surveillance for 10 days
  • If the contact develops any symptoms, the contact should self report via the telephone to the public health authority
  • Contact is free to continue with usual activities
  • The most consistent first symptom which is likely to appear is fever

Most national health authorities may wish to consider risk assessment on an individual basis and supplement the guidelines for the management of contacts of suspected SARS cases accordingly.

Removal from Follow up

If as a result of investigations, suspected or probable cases of SARS are discarded (no longer meet suspect or probable case definitions) then contacts can be discharged from follow up.

Image Source:

Department of Microbiology,
The University of Hong Kong and the Government Virus Unit,
Department of Health,
Hong Kong SAR China

Author:

Dr. Tamer Fouad, M.D.

source: doctorslounge.com

CHICAGO – Observational studies which report that influenza vaccination reduces winter mortality risk among the elderly by 50 percent may substantially overestimate the vaccination benefit, according to the February 14 issue of The Archives of Internal Medicine, one of the JAMA/Archives journals.

Accurate determination of the impact of influenza on mortality is difficult because the infection is often cleared before the onset of the secondary complications that actually cause a person's death, according to the article. Although influenza vaccination of the elderly in the U.S. has increased from 15 to 20 percent before 1980 to 65 percent in 2001, the authors could find no correlation between this increasing vaccination coverage after 1980 and declining deaths rates in any age group. Observational studies may introduce a systematic bias that leads to a substantial over-estimate of the impact of influenza vaccination on mortality, the authors suggest.

Lone Simonsen, Ph.D., of the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases, and colleagues, used statistical models that estimate the winter-seasonal all-cause mortality above an estimated baseline to determine influenza-related mortality indirectly. Their model incorporated information on deaths among the elderly from pneumonia and influenza and all other causes from 33 winter seasons from 1968-2001. "Our results, based on national vital statistics, are simply not consistent with the very large mortality benefits reported in observational studies," the authors write. The authors suggest that this disconnect may be explained by a disparity in who is likely to be vaccinated. "Very ill elderly people, whose fragile health would make them highly likely to die over the coming winter months, are less likely to be vaccinated during the autumn vaccination period," they stated.

source: doctorslounge.com

The World Health Organization (WHO) has warned of a substantial risk of an influenza epidemic in the near future, most probably from the H5N1 type of avian influenza virus.

One of the primary concerns is that the virus could quickly spread across countries as various birds follow their migration routes. In response, countries have begun planning in anticipation of an outbreak. While short-term strategies to deal with an outbreak focus on limiting travel and culling and vaccinating poultry, long-term strategies require substantial changes in the lifestyles of the most at-risk populations.

WHO announced on November, 16, 2005 that an outbreak is most likely to hit the Hong Kong Special Administrative issue by mid-December of this year. "If it were to hit in a highly residential area like Tin Hau, it would be sure to spread like wildfire." Dr. N Column, Head of Epidemic Prevention announced.

The WHO divides a pandemic into six phases, ranging from minimal risk of an outbreak to full scale pandemic. Most health authorities categorize the situation as of 2005 at Phase 3, by which is meant that human infections of a new sub-type has occurred but there is little evidence of sustained human-to-human transmission.

Avian influenza (bird flu)

Avian influenza, or “bird flu”, is a contagious disease of animals caused by viruses that normally infect only birds and, less commonly, pigs. Avian influenza viruses are highly species-specific, but have, on rare occasions, crossed the species barrier to infect humans.

In domestic poultry, infection with avian influenza viruses causes two main forms of disease. The so-called “low pathogenic” form commonly causes only mild symptoms (ruffled feathers, a drop in egg production) and may easily go undetected. The highly pathogenic form is far more dramatic. It spreads very rapidly through poultry flocks, causes disease affecting multiple internal organs, and has a mortality that can approach 100%, often within 48 hours.

Influenza A viruses have 16 H subtypes and 9 N subtypes. Only viruses of the H5 and H7 subtypes are known to cause the highly pathogenic form of the disease. On present understanding, H5 and H7 viruses may circulate and infect poultry flocks in their low pathogenic form. The viruses can then mutate, usually within a few months, into the highly pathogenic form. This is why the presence of an H5 or H7 virus in poultry is always cause for concern, even when the initial signs of infection are mild.

Risks posed to humans

The first risk that the virus poses to humans is the risk of direct infection when the virus passes from poultry to humans, resulting in very severe disease. Of the few avian influenza viruses that have crossed the species barrier to infect humans, H5N1 has caused the largest number of cases of severe disease and death in humans. Primary viral pneumonia and multi-organ failure are common. In the present outbreak, more than half of those infected with the virus have died. Most cases have occurred in previously healthy children and young adults.

The second and greater risk, is that the virus – if given enough opportunities – will change into a form that is highly infectious for humans and spreads easily from person to person. Such a change could mark the start of a global outbreak (a pandemic).

The current outbreak

The current outbreaks of highly pathogenic avian influenza, which began in South-east Asia in mid-2003, are the largest and most severe on record. Never before in the history of this disease have so many countries been simultaneously affected, resulting in the loss of so many birds.

The causative agent, the H5N1 virus, has proved to be especially tenacious. Despite the death or destruction of an estimated 150 million birds, the virus is now considered endemic in many parts of Indonesia and Viet Nam and in some parts of Cambodia, China, Thailand, and possibly also the Lao People’s Democratic Republic. Control of the disease in poultry is expected to take several years. Other countries have also reported poultry outbreaks caused by the H5N1 virus such as the Republic of Korea, Japan, Malaysia, Russia, Kazakhstan, Mongolia; and most recently Turkey and Romania. Most of these countries had never before experienced an outbreak of highly pathogenic avian influenza in their histories.

Japan, the Republic of Korea, and Malaysia have announced control of their poultry outbreaks and are now considered free of the disease. In the other affected areas, outbreaks are continuing with varying degrees of severity.

The role of migratory birds in the spread of highly pathogenic avian influenza is not fully understood. Wild waterfowl are considered the natural reservoir of all influenza A viruses. They are known to carry viruses of the H5 and H7 subtypes, but usually in the low pathogenic form. Considerable circumstantial evidence suggests that migratory birds can introduce low pathogenic H5 and H7 viruses to poultry flocks, which can then mutate to the highly pathogenic form. In such cases migratory birds would be directly spreading the H5N1 virus in its highly pathogenic form. Further spread to new areas would thus be expected.

Mode of transmission

Human influenza is transmitted by inhalation of infectious droplets and droplet nuclei, by direct contact, and perhaps, by indirect (fomite) contact, with self-inoculation onto the upper respiratory tract or conjunctival mucosa.

Currently, H5N1 does not spread easily among humans. Though more than 100 human cases have occurred in the current outbreak, this is a small number compared with the huge number of birds affected and the numerous associated opportunities for human exposure, especially in areas where backyard flocks are common. It is not presently understood why some people, and not others, become infected following similar exposures.

H5N1 can be transmitted to humans by several methods:

  1. Animal to human

  2. Environment to human

  3. Human to human

1. Animal to human transmission

Most patients to date have had a history of direct contact with poultry. Exposure to ill poultry and butchering of birds were associated with seropositivity for influenza A (H5N1).

Direct contact with infected poultry is presently considered the main route of human infection. Plucking and preparing of diseased birds; handling fighting cocks; playing with poultry, particularly asymptomatic infected ducks; and consumption of duck’s blood or possibly undercooked poultry have all been implicated.

Transmission to felids has been observed by feeding raw infected chickens to tigers and leopards in zoos in Thailand and to domestic cats under experimental conditions.

It is considered safe to eat poultry and poultry products though certain precautions should be followed in countries currently experiencing outbreaks. In areas free of the disease, poultry and poultry products can be prepared and consumed as usual (following good hygienic practices and proper cooking), with no fear of acquiring infection with the H5N1 virus.

Normal temperatures used for cooking (70°C in all parts of the food) will kill the virus in areas experiencing outbreaks. Avian influenza is not transmitted through cooked food. To date, no evidence indicates that anyone has become infected following the consumption of properly cooked poultry or poultry products, even when these foods were contaminated with the H5N1 virus. Consumers need to be sure that all parts of the poultry are fully cooked (no “pink” parts) and that eggs, too, are properly cooked (no “runny” yolks).

Soap and hot water are sufficient to disinfect the surfaces that come in contact with poultry products and for cleaning in persons involved in handling raw poultry or in food preparation.

2. Environment to human transmission

Given the survival of influenza A (H5N1) in the environment, several other modes of transmission are theoretically possible. Oral ingestion of contaminated water during swimming and direct intranasal or conjunctival inoculation during exposure to water are other potential modes, as is contamination of hands from infected fomites and subsequent self-inoculation. The widespread use of untreated poultry feces as fertilizer is another possible risk factor.

3. Human to human transmission

Human-to-human transmission of influenza A (H5N1) has been suggested in several household
clusters and in one case of apparent child-to-mother transmission. Intimate contact without the use of precautions was implicated, and so far no case of human-to-human transmission by small-particle aerosols has been identified.

Recently, intensified surveillance of contacts of patients by reverse-transcriptase–polymerase-chain-reaction (RT-PCR) assay has led to the detection of mild cases, more infections in older adults, and an increased number and duration of clusters in families in northern Vietnam, findings suggesting that the local virus strains may be adapting to humans.

However, epidemiologic and virologic studies are needed to confirm these findings. To date, the risk of nosocomial transmission to health care workers has been low, even when appropriate
isolation measures were not used. However, one case of severe illness was reported in a nurse exposed to an infected patient in Vietnam.

The risk of a pandemic

A pandemic can start when three conditions have been met:

  1. A new influenza virus subtype emerges

  2. It infects humans, causing serious illness

  3. It spreads easily and sustainably among humans

The H5N1 virus amply meets the first two conditions: it is a new virus for humans (H5N1 viruses have never circulated widely among people), and it has infected more than 100 humans, killing over half of them. No one will have immunity should an H5N1-like pandemic virus emerge.

All prerequisites for the start of a pandemic have therefore been met save one: the establishment of efficient and sustained human-to-human transmission of the virus. The risk that the H5N1 virus will acquire this ability will persist as long as opportunities for human infections occur. These opportunities, in turn, will persist as long as the virus continues to circulate in birds, and this situation could endure for some years to come.

The risk of pandemic influenza is serious. With the H5N1 virus now firmly entrenched in large parts of Asia, the risk that more human cases will occur will persist. Each additional human case gives the virus an opportunity to improve its transmissibility in humans, and thus develop into a pandemic strain. The recent spread of the virus to poultry and wild birds in new areas further broadens opportunities for human cases to occur. While neither the timing nor the severity of the next pandemic can be predicted, the probability that a pandemic will occur has increased.

The virus can improve its transmissibility among humans via two principal mechanisms. The first is a “reassortment” event, in which genetic material is exchanged between human and avian viruses during co-infection of a human or pig. Reassortment could result in a fully transmissible pandemic virus, announced by a sudden surge of cases with explosive spread.

The second mechanism is a more gradual process of adaptive mutation, whereby the capability of the virus to bind to human cells increases during subsequent infections of humans. Adaptive mutation, expressed initially as small clusters of human cases with some evidence of human-to-human transmission, would probably give the world some time to take defensive action.

If an influenza pandemic occurs the condition can rapidly affect all countries. Once international spread begins, pandemics are considered unstoppable, caused as they are by a virus that spreads very rapidly by coughing or sneezing. The fact that infected people can shed virus before symptoms appear adds to the risk of international spread via asymptomatic air travelers.

During past pandemics, attack rates reached 25-35% of the total population. Under the best circumstances, assuming that the new virus causes mild disease, the world could still experience an estimated 2 million to 7.4 million deaths (projected from data obtained during the 1957 pandemic). Projections for a more virulent virus are much higher. The 1918 pandemic, which was exceptional, killed at least 40 million people.

Pandemics can cause large surges in the numbers of people requiring or seeking medical or hospital treatment, temporarily overwhelming health services. The high rates of illness could also have devastating effects on world commerce.










Clinical picture

The clinical spectrum of influenza A (H5N1) in humans is based on descriptions of hospitalized patients.

The frequencies of milder illnesses, subclinical infections, and atypical presentations (e.g., encephalopathy and gastroenteritis) have not been determined, but case reports indicate that each occurs. Most patients have been previously healthy young children or adults.

Incubation

The incubation period of avian influenza A (H5N1) may be longer than for other known human influenzas with ranges of up to eight days. The case-to-case intervals in household clusters have generally been 2 to 5 days, but the upper limit has been 8 to 17 days, possibly owing to unrecognized exposure to infected animals or environmental sources.

Initial symptoms

Most patients have initial symptoms of high fever (typically a temperature of more than 38°C) and an influenza-like illness with lower respiratory tract symptoms. Upper respiratory tract symptoms are present only sometimes. Diarrhea, vomiting, abdominal pain, pleuritic pain, and bleeding from the nose and gums have also been reported early in the course of illness in some patients.

Clinical course

Lower respiratory tract manifestations develop early in the course of illness and are usually found at presentation. In one series, dyspnea developed a median of 5 days after the onset of illness (range, 1 to 16). Respiratory distress, tachypnea, and inspiratory crackles are common. Sputum production is variable and sometimes bloody. Almost all patients have clinically apparent pneumonia; radiographic changes include diffuse, multifocal, or patchy infiltrates; interstitial infiltrates; and segmental or lobular consolidation with air bronchograms. Radiographic abnormalities were present a median of 7 days after the onset of fever in one study (range, 3 to 17). In Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam, multifocal consolidation involving at least two zones was the most common abnormality among patients at the time of admission. Pleural effusions are uncommon. Limited microbiologic data indicate that this process is a primary viral pneumonia, usually without bacterial suprainfection at the time of hospitalization.

Progression to respiratory failure has been associated with diffuse, bilateral, ground-glass infiltrates and manifestations of the acute respiratory distress syndrome (ARDS). In Thailand,
15 the median time from the onset of illness to ARDS was 6 days (range, 4 to 13). Multiorgan failure with signs of renal dysfunction and sometimes cardiac compromise, including cardiac dilatation and supraventricular tachyarrhythmias, has been common.

Mortality

Recent avian influenza A (H5N1) infections have caused high rates of death among infants and young children. The case fatality rate was 89 percent among those younger than 15 years of age in Thailand. Death has occurred an average of 9 or 10 days after the onset of illness (range, 6 to 30), and most patients have died of progressive respiratory failure.

The risk of a pandemic

A pandemic can start when three conditions have been met:

  1. A new influenza virus subtype emerges

  2. It infects humans, causing serious illness

  3. It spreads easily and sustainably among humans

The H5N1 virus amply meets the first two conditions: it is a new virus for humans (H5N1 viruses have never circulated widely among people), and it has infected more than 100 humans, killing over half of them. No one will have immunity should an H5N1-like pandemic virus emerge.

All prerequisites for the start of a pandemic have therefore been met save one: the establishment of efficient and sustained human-to-human transmission of the virus. The risk that the H5N1 virus will acquire this ability will persist as long as opportunities for human infections occur. These opportunities, in turn, will persist as long as the virus continues to circulate in birds, and this situation could endure for some years to come.

The risk of pandemic influenza is serious. With the H5N1 virus now firmly entrenched in large parts of Asia, the risk that more human cases will occur will persist. Each additional human case gives the virus an opportunity to improve its transmissibility in humans, and thus develop into a pandemic strain. The recent spread of the virus to poultry and wild birds in new areas further broadens opportunities for human cases to occur. While neither the timing nor the severity of the next pandemic can be predicted, the probability that a pandemic will occur has increased.

The virus can improve its transmissibility among humans via two principal mechanisms. The first is a “reassortment” event, in which genetic material is exchanged between human and avian viruses during co-infection of a human or pig. Reassortment could result in a fully transmissible pandemic virus, announced by a sudden surge of cases with explosive spread.

The second mechanism is a more gradual process of adaptive mutation, whereby the capability of the virus to bind to human cells increases during subsequent infections of humans. Adaptive mutation, expressed initially as small clusters of human cases with some evidence of human-to-human transmission, would probably give the world some time to take defensive action.

If an influenza pandemic occurs the condition can rapidly affect all countries. Once international spread begins, pandemics are considered unstoppable, caused as they are by a virus that spreads very rapidly by coughing or sneezing. The fact that infected people can shed virus before symptoms appear adds to the risk of international spread via asymptomatic air travelers.

During past pandemics, attack rates reached 25-35% of the total population. Under the best circumstances, assuming that the new virus causes mild disease, the world could still experience an estimated 2 million to 7.4 million deaths (projected from data obtained during the 1957 pandemic). Projections for a more virulent virus are much higher. The 1918 pandemic, which was exceptional, killed at least 40 million people.

Pandemics can cause large surges in the numbers of people requiring or seeking medical or hospital treatment, temporarily overwhelming health services. The high rates of illness could also have devastating effects on world commerce.

Diagnosis

Laboratory findings

Common laboratory findings have been leukopenia, particularly lymphopenia; mild-to-moderate
thrombocytopenia; and slightly or moderately elevated aminotransferase levels. Marked hyperglycemia, perhaps related to corticosteroid use, and elevated creatinine levels also occur. In Thailand, an increased risk of death was associated with decreased leukocyte, platelet, and particularly, lymphocyte counts at the time of admission.

Virologic diagnosis

Antemortem diagnosis of influenza A (H5N1) has been confirmed by viral isolation, the detection of H5-specific RNA, or both methods. Although avian influenza virus in humans can be detected with standard influenza virus tests, these tests have not always proved reliable.

Unlike human influenza A infection, avian influenza A (H5N1) infection may be associated with a higher frequency of virus detection and higher viral RNA levels in pharyngeal than in nasal samples. In Vietnam, the interval from the onset of illness to the detection of viral RNA in throat-swab samples ranged from 2 to 15 days (median, 5.5), and the viral loads in pharyngeal swabs 4 to 8 days after the onset of illness were at least 10 times as high among patients with influenza A (H5N1).

Commercial rapid antigen tests are less sensitive in detecting influenza A (H5N1) infections than are RT-PCR assays. In Thailand, the results of rapid antigen testing were positive in only 4 of 11 patients with culture-positive influenza A (H5N1) (36 percent) 4 to 18 days after the onset of illness.

Microneutralization requires use of the live virus to interact with antibodies from the patient's blood; because live virus is required, for safety reasons the test can only be done in a level three laboratory.

Treatment

Antiviral drugs such as olestamivir (commercially known as Tamiflu), zanamivir (commercially known as Relenza) and amantadine are sometimes effective in both preventing and treating the infection. Countries have been stockpiling olestamivir, but may shift towards zanamivir due to a November 2005 issue of JAMA, which reported olestamivir resistant strains of avian flu in Vietnam.

Further, as a result of widespread use of the antiviral drug amantadine as a preventive or treatment for chickens in China starting in the late 1990s, some strains of the avian flu virus in Asia have developed drug resistance against amantadine.

Vaccines effective against a pandemic virus are not yet available. Vaccines take at least four months to produce and must be prepared for each subtype. Because the vaccine needs to closely match the pandemic virus, large-scale commercial production will not start until the new virus has emerged and a pandemic has been declared. Current global production capacity falls far short of the demand expected during a pandemic.

source: doctorslounge.com